Thursday, November 27, 2008

Spanish Civil War

Three movements or underlying problems that developed in the 19th and early 20th century that can be traced to contributing to the spark of the military uprising of 1936 and the Spanish Civil War are the failure of liberalism, the role of the Military and the peripheral/regional issue.
One of the elements of the Spanish liberal tradition was the failure to take root, and the lack of a successful liberal government would echo in the 20th century as the Second Republic floundered. The Spanish liberal tradition began in the years 1808-1814, while it was under attack from French invasion. As the Spanish fought off the Napoleonic invasion, the Spanish Cortés was relocated to Sevilla and then to Cádiz, where in 1812 it wrote what has become to be called the Constitution of 1812. It called for many liberal ideas and implementations, such as universal suffrage, disamortization of Church lands and freedom of religion. It failed to take root, and General Elío declared a pronunciamiento in 1814 that placed Fernando VII (El Rey Deseado) at the throne and allowed for the Constitution to be revoked. Liberals again took the civil power with the help of the Military in 1820, and for three years the ‘trienio’ again attempted to implement liberal ideas without success. Foreign intervention, once more coming in from their neighbors to the north, re-installed Fernando VII to the throne and thwarted liberal government. From 1834-1836 what was known as the Estatuto was briefly implemented and undone. Liberals were divided as to the form that the liberal state should take; some were monarchists, some were republicans, some were more self-interested, and there was also a division between the more established and the younger liberals. In addition, many of the populace were either indifferent to liberalism or unaware, as the high illiteracy rate and slow flow of information allowed certain powerful groups to control the production and dissemination of news and information. By 1868, General Prim and other generals declared another pronunciamiento which was to eventually lead to the First Republic. It was short-lived, and it’s failure was subsequently followed by 50 years of the Canovine system of ‘turno pacífico’, where the progressive and moderate parties would theoretically share power, every 5 years turning it over to the other side. They would manufacture votes through the cacique system and social reforms were kept to a minimal. After this system was finally dismantled in 1923, it was followed by Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship until 1930 (with the blessing of Alfonso XIII, which ironically was also to lead to his downfall and exile). By 1931, enough support from both conservative and liberal parties led to the creation of the Second Republic. The left was divided among many different groups, including the socialist PSOE, Partido Socialista de Obreros Españoles, the PCE, Partido Comunista de España, and anarchist groups who were opposed to any form of bourgeoisie state but welcomed the Republic as a change from the extremely repressive Canovine system and Primo de Rivera dictatorship. The many workers’ strikes and uprisings had been put down with violent reprisals, and the hope of the CNT and the anarchists was that the Second Republic would be less oppressive in its measures. They were to be disappointed though, as uprisings in 1933 in Casas Viejas and in 1934 in Austurias (symbolically these were key, although there were many other areas and strikes/uprisings) were handled with extreme violence and repression by the Republican government in the hands of the Left and the Right. After the 1934 Austurias uprising was squashed by the Conservative-led CEDA government, many anarchists realized that their best bet was a Leftist government, and after the split of 1933 had led to a conservative victory at the polls, the various distinct parties formed the Frente Popular and won what turned out to be an ephemeral victory in 1936.
What followed was much unrest from the conservative base, many of whom had decided that dismantling the Republic from the inside was not their best strategy. Instead, military planning which had begun much earlier was strengthened and after the death of Calvo Sotelo, Franco joined General Mola and many others for the military uprising of July 17th, 1936. Yet again, the military had become involved in the politics of Spain. It had a long history of involvement in politics, from General Elío’s pronunciamiento in 1814. Their disastrous losses against France and Britain, including the famous battle of Trafalgar in 1805, as well as the poor financial state of Spain at the turn of the century, contributed to an Army that was top-heavy, not modernized, and unhappy. There was also the beginning of the losses of the colonies, the disintegration of the Empire, which not only weakened Spain financially but militarily, as the losses mounted in vain attempts to secure the colonies and then the blame that was distributed for these losses. At first the Military sympathized with the liberals, as evidenced by their support and assistance with the removal of Fernando VII and the support of the trienio. They were so weak, however, that they could not repel French intervention in 1823. The military was consistently involved in the civilian politics and also seen as the best way to keep law and order. Any fears of unrest would be put down by the military, and the creation of the Guardia Civil by General Narváez was an important step in the use of military force and the existence of a military force that was fiercely loyal to the leaders of the government. Since the military had a history of intervention in politics, it was no surprise to see the Revolution of ’68 led by Generals, who removed Isabel and began the process of replacing her and the debates as to who would lead Spain and in what form of government. By 1873, King Amadeo had already abdicated after a 3 year reign, and the vacuum that was left was the First Republic. Once the turno pacífico was agreed upon after the First Republic fell, the military was a force that was to be relied upon by the government to keep strikers and revolutionary tensions at bay. However, the military was losing force as in 1898, Spain was at war with the United States and lost, resulting in the final dissolution of the Spanish Empire and the colonies of the Philippines, Cuba and Puerto Rico. This military defeat left them humiliated and they took the blame, and it caused a need for rethinking the Spanish identity. Later wars in Morocco also put a strain on the ill-equipped, non-modernized and ill-trained Spanish Army. The division in the Army between those who served in Africa, los africanistas, and those who did not, los peninsularistas, helped cause problems as the system of promotion was debated. Should the promotions be based upon merit or years of service? In addition, compulsory military service was not so, as the rich could buy their way out of the military, which resulted in many of the poor having to pick up the slack. This added to the grumbling. With Spain suffering unexpected defeats in Morocco after already fighting there from 1909-1914, the Spanish public was outraged. The military was going to take the blame, the government was going to take the blame, there was going to be inquiries and responsibilities. This is one of the reasons that led to Alfonso XIII supporting the military takeover by Primo de Rivera, who was staunchly against Spain’s presence in Morocco, and would also help defray the responsibilities issue. Ironically, during his dictatorship, France and Spain united against native forces in Morocco and were victorious. The precedent had been set throughout the years: the Military guaranteed stability, or supposedly did so, it guaranteed law and order, and was a key player in civilian politics. If the unity of Spain was under threat, the Military had the right to intervene in the name of saving Spain, which is what the military uprising of 1936 claimed. The plans had been laid, and Calvo Sotelo’s murder (retribution for a previous murder) enraged enough people that the uprising was to move forward and Franco was convinced of its chances for success.
How did the peripheral/regional question fit in to the explosion of this crisis which was the Spanish Civil War? Due to Spain’s reliance on land and Agrarian production for most of its economy, there was a lack of industrialization compared to other parts of Europe. Where industrialization did take root was mainly in the north, in Vizcaya and Catalonia. Immigration from the countryside to the cities was tame, as the amount of jobs was not sufficient to support the influx of new workers. Many returned back to their rural towns and the strength of regional loyalties was high. One of the contentious issues between liberals had been this question: Do we want a government that will be centrally strong or a federal system with more autonomy for the disparate regions? In the late 1800s, a movement that first began as nostalgic quickly turned to contemporary issues in Catalonia as some of the anarchist workers as well as industrialists were looking at the need for expression of their difference. The Catalan industrialists felt that they paid a high percentage of the taxes but did not have sufficient representation in the centrally located government. Self-rule was an issue, but there was a conflict of interest for the industrialists in Catalonia, who wanted more autonomy but also wanted to insure control over their workers and their businesses. They feared a revolution, so their alliance with the anarchist workers was porous and easily stretched. Offered incentives and assurances of protection by Primo de Rivera, the Catalan bourgeoisie actually supported his ascension to power, but were quickly disappointed with his repressive moves and centralist beliefs. All sort of autonomy was removed; by the time the Second Republic had come to be, many in Catalonia decided their time was now and Lluís Companys and others formed the Esquerra party, which participated in the central government and was granted many autonomous rights, only to have those same rights stripped by the conservative bienio negro of ’33-’35. They too formed a part of the Left coalition in the Frente Popular, and Companys’ death became emblematic of the outcome for regional autonomy if Franco and the Nationalists were to be victorious…

No comments: